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Abstract
This paper responds to arguments due to Joel Smith and Annalisa Coliva that try to
show that James Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification is philosophically uninterest-
ing, and perhaps even spurious. It also proposes definitions of wh-misidentification
and immunity to wh-misidentification which try to improve in various ways on the
characterisations that standardly figure in the literature, and explores the relationship
between misidentification and the epistemic structures characteristic of some kinds of
Gettier cases.
Keywords Immunity to error through misidentification · First-person thought · De
se · GETTIER Problem · Wh-misidentification
1 Introduction
Certain judgments seem to be immune to error through misidentification when made
on the right kinds of grounds. For example, suppose that I judge that I see a barn,
as a piece of routine psychological self-knowledge. My judgment might be in error,
since I may be looking at a convincing façade. But there doesn’t seem to be any room
for me to be in error in the following way; I’m right that someone sees a barn, but
I’ve misidentified them as myself. In contrast, if I judge that Lisa sees a barn, based
on tracking her direction of gaze and so on, I can (in principle at least) fall into error
either because Lisa is not seeing a barn or because it is not Lisa who is seeing a barn,
but rather someone I’ve misidentified as Lisa.
In an influential paper (1999), James Pryor refined our understanding of this phe-
nomenon in at least two respects. First, we can note that error throughmisidentification
is a species of a more general phenomenon, which we can simply call misidentifica-
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tion.1 Suppose that I judge that Lisa sees a barn, as above. In fact, it is not Lisa, but a
lookalike. Now, here’s the twist (of a sort familiar from the literature on Gettier cases);
as it happens, Lisa is seeing a barn right as I judge that she is. My judgment that Lisa
sees a barn doesn’t involve an error through misidentification, since it’s correct. Still,
it does involve misidentification, as I’m conceiving of it; my judgment is only true by
luck, and this is because it rests on a mistaken identification.
Pryor also proposed that there are two varieties of misidentification to be reck-
oned with. I might be justified in judging that some particular person—the woman
whose direction of gaze I’m tracking, say—sees a barn, and misidentify that woman
as Lisa. Or I might have grounds for the existential claim that someone sees a barn,
and misidentify Lisa as a witness to that existential. Let us call the first de remisiden-
tification, and the second which object misidentification, or wh-misidentification for
short. Corresponding to these, we will have two notions of immunity to misidenti-
fication: immunity to de re misidentification and immunity to wh-misidentification.
Having distinguished these, Pryor argues that immunity to wh-misidentification is the
more interesting and fundamental notion. He bases this latter conclusion largely on
the contention that it’s immunity to wh-misidentification that we need to appeal to if
we’re to accommodate Sydney Shoemaker’s (1970) observation that the metaphysical
possibility that one might have memory impressions that derive from someone else’s
past shows (contrary to Evans 1982), that memory-based judgments about one’s own
past are vulnerable to misidentification.
I have two main aims in this paper. First, I respond to two attempts to show that
Pryor’s distinction between de re and wh-misidentification is not as deep or as sig-
nificant as he suggests, due to Joel Smith and Annalisa Coliva. In Sect. 2 I offer
preliminary characterisations of de re misidentification, wh-misidentification, and the
respective varieties of immunity more carefully, and then in Sects. 3 and 4 I lay out
and criticise Smith’s andColiva’s arguments againstwh-misidentification respectively.
My second aim in this paper is to improve our understanding of wh-misidentification
and the associated notions of immunity and vulnerability, and I do this by offering
refined characterisations in Sect. 5, in light of morals drawn from earlier sections. My
account centres and explores a connection that emerges between the phenomenon of
misidentification and the kinds of epistemological structures characteristic of some
familiar Gettier cases.
2 Two varieties of misidentification
Let’s begin by sharpening our understanding of Pryor’s two varieties of misidentifi-
cation. Loosely following Pryor (1999: 274–275), let us characterise a case of de re
misidentification as follows:
i. One has grounds G that justify one in judging, of some particular object b, that it
is F.
ii. One mistakenly (though perhaps justifiably) accepts that a  b.




iii. One judges that a is F, and this judgment rests on one’s belief that b is F together
with one’s acceptance of the mistaken bridging identity claim.2
In our earlier example, I have grounds that justify me in judging that the woman I am
observing sees a barn. However, I mistakenly believe that this woman is Lisa, and on
that basis I judge that Lisa sees a barn. In line with a point made in the introduction,
this is not intended as a characterisation of error through misidentification. Nothing
in the conditions just offered requires that one’s judgment that a is F be false; rather,
given the misidentification, one’s judgment can at best be true by luck. Let us say that
a judgment is immune to de re misidentification when made on certain grounds when
it’s impossible for cases of de re misidentification to arise when that judgment is made
on those grounds.3
The basic idea underlying Pryor’s characterisation of immunity to wh-
misidentification is simple enough: a judgment a is F is immune when made on
certain grounds just in case it’s impossible for that de re judgment to be defeated and
yet one’s grounds continue to justify one in the fallback existential claim that some-
thing is F.4 However, Pryor’s own attempt to make this more precise is surprisingly
complex and involves appeal to notions not needed to state his account of immunity to
de re misidentification. Here, first of all, are his conditions for wh-misidentification:
i′. One has grounds G that offer one knowledge of the existential generalization
that something is F.5
ii′. Partly on the basis of G, the subject is also justified, or takes herself to be
justified, in believing of some object a that it is F.
iii′. But in fact a is not F. Some distinct object (or objects) y isF, and it’s because
the grounds G “derive” in the right way from this fact about y that they offer the
subject knowledge of the existential. (1999: 282).
Here’s Pryor’s own example to illustrate (1999: 281):
2 As Wright notes (2012: 253), this really characterizes ‘basic’ cases of de re misidentification; there are
slightly more complex cases, but they differ from the basic ones only in entirely superficial ways and so I
ignore them here.
3 Pryor prefers to define immunity first for pairs of propositions and grounds (1999: 279, 283), rather than
judgments and grounds, but nothing turns on this here. Notice that the characterisation just offered doesn’t
require that one believe the mistaken identity claim, nor that one’s judgment that a is F is epistemically
based on such a belief. A number of philosophers have suggested that a judgment can be vulnerable to
de re misidentification even when made on grounds that are free of any identity claims through having an
identification as a presupposition (Coliva 2006; Wright 2012), or in Pryor’s terminology, a judgment can
rest on an identification without being based on it (1999: 291).
4 Unhelpfully, this is sometimes offered as a characterisation of immunity to error through misidenti-
fication in general, without any heed being paid to the distinction between de re misidentification and
wh-misidentification (e.g. Wright 1998; Stanley 1999; Stanley 2011; Hamilton 2013; and Salje 2017).
5 One’s grounds G offer one knowledge that P just in case, were one to be believe that P on the basis of G
and to possess no defeating evidence, then one would know that P (Pryor 1999: 281-2)—so that it being the
case that one’s grounds offer one knowledge that P doesn’t entail that one knows that P, or that one believes
that P, or that one’s grounds offer one all-things-considered justification for believing that P. However, this
does introduce a factive notion into the characterisation, and this has some peculiar consequences which
I have discussed elsewhere (McGlynn 2016: 34-5); I won’t rehearse that discussion again here, though I
discuss this issue briefly in Sect. 5 below.
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I smell a skunky odor, and see several animals rummaging around in my garden.
None of them has the characteristic white stripes of a skunk, but I believe that
some skunks lack these stripes. Approaching closer and sniffing, I form a belief,
of the smallest of these animals, that it is a skunk in my garden. This belief is
mistaken. There are several skunks in my garden, but none of them is the small
animal I see.
In this example, I have grounds that offer me knowledge of the existential claim
that there’s a skunk in my garden, namely the skunky odour (and perhaps my visual
evidence of the presence of animals in my garden). Partly on the basis of the odour
again, I gain (or take myself to gain) justification that the smallest of the animals in
my garden is a skunk. However, my grounds do not derive from this animal, but from
other animals in my garden. Pryor stipulates that my judgment that this animal is a
skunk in my garden is mistaken, but in principle it could instead be true by luck; we
can suppose, for example, that I’m right that some skunks in fact lack stripes, and that
the smallest animal in my garden is a case in point, but that it has not contributed to
the skunky odour in my garden.6 Were I to somehow learn that the animal I form my
judgment about is not in fact responsible for the odour I can smell, this would defeat
my judgment that that (namely, the smallest animal in my garden) is a skunk in my
garden, yet the existential judgment that there is a skunk in my garden would remain
justified by my grounds.
How are these two varieties of misidentification related? The skunk example is
meant to illustrate that cases ofwh-misidentification need not be cases of de remisiden-
tification (1999: 285), and this is an issuewe’ll return to inmore detail below. Pryor also
holds that cases of de re misidentification need not be cases of wh-misidentification.
In Pryor’s example, I see that the blue-coated man is carrying a gun, and having
misidentified this man as Sam, I form the false belief that Sam is carrying a gun
(1999: 275). This is a case of de re misidentification, but Pryor says it’s not a case of
wh-misidentification since ‘I do correctly come to know, of the blue-coated man, that
he is carrying a gun’ (1999: 285). However, things get more interesting at the level
of immunity and vulnerability to different varieties of misidentification. Pryor argues
that if a judgment is immune to wh-misidentification when made on grounds G, then
it will also be immune to de re misidentification relative to G. Here’s the thought.
Suppose I judge that a is F on grounds G, and it’s not ruled out that this judgment rests
on a mistaken judgment that a is identical to b together with an antecedent judgment
that b is F. Then it’s possible that one’s grounds G offer one knowledge that some-
thing is F because they derive from b, and one justifiably but mistakenly take them
to derive from a. In contrast, a judgment’s being immune to de re misidentification
doesn’t entail that it’s immune to wh-misidentification; for example, Pryor’s takes the
skunk example to be a case of (vulnerability to) wh-misidentification in which one’s
judgment is immune to de re misidentification, since
6 If this seems too far-fetched, we can change the example to involve another animal with a distinctive
odour but without distinctive visual identifying marks.
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my belief that that animal is a skunk does not rest on any identity assumption.
There is no particular animal I antecedently know to be a skunk, which I could
reidentify as the small animal I see. (1999: 285–286)
It’s these claims—that cases of wh-misidentification don’t involve mistaken identi-
ties of the sort characteristic of de re misidentification, and that immunity to de re
misidentification doesn’t entail immunity to wh-misidentification—that give rise to
most of the controversy surrounding immunity to wh-misidentification and Pryor’s
discussion of it. The first controversy concerns Pryor’s claim that cases such as the
skunk example feature judgments that don’t rest on any identity assumptions, and
the second concerns the way he exploits the apparent gap between immunity to de re
misidentification and immunity to wh-misidentification in offering a resolution to the
debate between Shoemaker and Evans outlined in the introduction. What I have to say
in this paper will engage directly with the first of these controversies, but while I’ll
touch on the second controversy in the conclusion, I will have to leave those issues
for another occasion.
3 Smith’s objection
I’ll start in this section and the next by examining the two attempts to show that wh-
misidentification lacks the significance that Pryor accords it, and that we should be
focused on de re misidentification. Smith’s argument starts from the premise that we
want to preserve the close relationship between self-ascriptions that display immunity
to misidentification and those that are manifestations of self-consciousness. So an
account of immunity to misidentification should entail that ‘self-ascriptions that are
agreed by all to be central to our conception of ourselves as self-conscious subjects’,
paradigmatically self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states, are immune (2006: 274).
Smith then argues that many such self-ascriptions are not immune to wh-
misidentification, and so that this can’t be the right way of understanding immunity to
misidentification if we want to preserve the tie to self-consciousness. Consider again
my judgment that I see a barn, and suppose that I receive the following defeating evi-
dence; I am reliably told that my visual impression of a barn is caused by someone else
currently seeing a barn. This overriding evidence defeats my judgment, but leaves me
justified in retreating to the fallback existential claim that someone sees a barn (Smith
2006: 278). The point generalises well beyond this particular case, since it looks like
we’ll typically be able to concoct such defeating evidence, even when we’re dealing
with self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states on the basis of introspection.
The obvious problem with this objection is that the reason that one’s original
grounds together with the defeating evidence justify the fallback existential claim isn’t
that one’s original grounds were structured in such away that an existential-supporting
portion is left untouched by the defeater. Rather, it’s that the defeater itself furnishes
one with the existential information that someone sees a barn. Smith recognises this
problem, writing (2006: 279–280):
Can’t we simply reformulate our definition of [immunity to wh-
misidentification] so that the justification that the subject has for retreating to
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the general proposition must already be there in the justification for the original
singular judgment?
If our characterisation of immunity to wh-misidentification permits the defeating evi-
dence to provide one’s justification for the fallback existential, then whether one’s
original evidence in a given case would be capable of supporting that existential claim
becomes irrelevant to whether the characterisation is met. So the proposal Smith
floats here looks well motivated; we should require that one’s original evidence, and
not merely one’s defeating evidence, can justify the fallback existential in the face of
evidence that defeats one’s de re judgment.
However, Smith argues that if we impose this requirement, then we’ll collapse wh-
misidentification into de re misidentification. His argument is contained entirely in the
following sentence:
If, in the justification that I have for the singular judgment ‘I am F’ I am able
to discern two elements, one of which can be discarded and the other retained,
leaving me justified in thinking ‘Someone is F’, then it looks very much as if
that original judgment was based on the information that a was F and that I 
a, i.e. it was based on an identification. (2006: 280)
It’s worth noting, first of all, that there isn’t much of an argument here. Rather, the
characteristic epistemic architecture of de re misidentification is introduced without
any consideration of alternatives. More importantly, there are principled reasons to
resist Smith’s attempt to saddle his opponents with that architecture in examples like
Pryor’s skunk. My justification for the existential claim that there is a skunk in my
garden comes from the skunky odour, and so plausibly does not derive from any
justification I may have for judging that some particular object is a skunk in my
garden. As Pryor writes (1999: 282, italics in original):
I’m not yet in a position to believe, of some thing that I’m smelling, that it is
identical to anything else. In fact, I’m not yet in a position to hold any de re
beliefs about any of the things I’m smelling. I don’t yet have any correct beliefs,
about some particular animal, that I am smelling it, or that it is a skunk in my
garden. My problem is precisely to arrive at such a de re belief.7
The problem for Smith is that he commits to all putative examples of wh-
misidentification having the same underlying structure; there’s a parent judgment,
a is F, and a (mistaken) identification, b  a. And Pryor’s point in the passage just
quoted is that one isn’t in a position to form any parent judgment of this form in the
example described.
Moreover, Pryor offers a proposal about the kinds of grounds one has in cases of
wh-misidentification that invalidates Smith’s argument in the sentence quoted above.
Pryor’s focus is memory, and according to his proposal, memory offers one a ‘package
deal’ of justification (1999: 296); ‘it tells me that someone performed a certain action,
and it also tells me that I am the person who performed that action’. Now, recall
7 As Pryor acknowledges (1999: 301–2 n26), there is a very liberal view about what it takes to hold a de
re (i.e. singular) belief about an object that wouldn’t support his contention here. See Jeshion (2010) for
recent discussion and criticism of this view.
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Smith’s argument; he suggested that if I can discern two ‘elements’ in my original
grounds for the singular judgment that I am F, one of which can be defeated while the
other continues to justify the fallback existential, then it looks like my judgment must
rest on the de re judgment that a is F and the identity claim that I am a. This doesn’t
follow, if my grounds offer me the kind of ‘package deal’ that Pryor suggests. The
two ‘elements’ will just be the two components of the package that Pryor describes,
neither of which is as Smith claims it must be.
Smith has shownneither that immunity towh-misidentification fails to apply to even
promising cases, nor that wh-misidentification collapses into de re misidentification;
for all he has shown, it remains distinct and philosophically significant.8
4 Coliva’s Objection
Annalisa Coliva (2006) offers an argument for the conclusion that wh-identification
is not merely philosophically insignificant, but in fact ‘spurious’. Consider Pryor’s
skunk example again. I start out with independent warrant for judging that there is
a skunk in my garden, and I go wrong in misidentifying the animal I can see as the
witness to that existential; I go wrong in judging that this animal (that I can now see)
is a skunk. But, Coliva asks, what are the grounds of this final judgment? Coliva’s
proposal is that I make this judgment because I accept a false identity claim, namely
that this animal (that I can currently see)  the animal which is actually responsible
for this odour I can smell (Coliva 2006: 412). It’s the fact that I believe this, together
with my recognition of the odour as that characteristic of a skunk, that explains why
I (mistakenly) judge that this animal is a skunk. Moreover, just as in paradigm cases
of de re misidentification, this error is due to my having judged on the basis of a false
identity claim. We can lay Coliva’s reconstruction out as follows, and this will give us
a format for representing and comparing different proposals about different examples:
Existential claim There is a skunk in my garden
Parent judgment The animal which is actually responsible for this odour I can
smell is a skunk in my garden
Identity component This animal (that I can now see)  the animal which is actually
responsible for this odour I can smell
Final judgment This animal is a skunk in my garden
Any further differences between paradigm cases ofwh-misidentification and paradigm
cases of de re misidentification are, Coliva contends, merely superficial, to do with
the range of concepts that figure in the mistaken identity claims. In this sense, Coliva
takes Pryor to have failed to uncover a genuinely epistemically distinct variety of
misidentification.
None of the points I made above in response to Smith seem to get purchase here.
Coliva offers a prima facie plausible account of the grounds underwriting cases of
wh-misidentification, and she illustrates it with Pryor’s own skunk example (or so
it appears at first glance). And Coliva doesn’t say anything to beg the question
8 I here make good on an earlier promise to unpack my worries with Smith’s argument (2016: 41 fn14).
See García-Carpintero (2018: 3320 fn20) for a different worry with Smith’s argument.
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against Pryor’s ‘package deal’ proposal concerning the justifications that figure in
cases of wh-misidentification. However, Coliva’s argument for the spuriousness of
wh-misidentification faces problems of its own.
First, Crispin Wright has constructed other examples of wh-misidentification that
seem to cause Coliva’s proposal to misfire. Consider the following:
I am lost in a sandy desert and, attempting to walk out, come across footprints
which I misidentify as my own, concluding somewhat desperately, “I am going
round in circles.” Here the footprints give me reason to think that someone
(maybe with feet about my size) has passed this way already; and I thenmisiden-
tify—mistake myself for—the witness of that true existential claim. (2012: 256)
Taking Coliva’s treatment of the skunk example as our model, we want to determine
the grounds of my judgment that I have passed this way already. In the skunk case,
my grounds for my mistaken judgment that this animal that I can now see is a skunk
featured the parent belief that the animal in my garden that is actually responsible for
this odour I can smell is a skunk, together with the mistaken identify claim that this
animal that I can now see  the animal in my garden that is actually responsible for
this odour I can smell; it is, of course, the presence of the latter—the mistaken iden-
tification—that allows Coliva to suggest that wh-misidentification doesn’t differ in
epistemically significant respects from de re misidentification. Returning to the sandy
desert, Wright thinks that it seems clear what the mistaken identity claim should be,
according to Coliva; it should be that I  the person who has passed this way before.
But what’s the parent judgment in this example? Following Coliva’s recipe, Wright
claims, commits us to holding that it is this: the person who caused these footprints in
the sand has passed this way already. However, this seems too informationally impov-
erished—Wright calls it ‘near enough, a tautology’ and ‘something quasi-tautologous’
(2012: 258)—to figure as part of a plausible reconstruction of my grounds in the exam-
ple.9 All that there is to go on in the parent judgment is that the person did the thing
that caused the subject’s grounds. In this respect, Wright’s case differs from Pryor’s
skunk example, where the object that I misidentify as the witness of the existential
is one I can think of independently of its being the cause of my grounds (since I can
think of it as the smallest of the animals I can see rummaging around my garden).
I think that Wright’s example poses a genuine problem for Coliva’s proposal, but
his objection stands in need of clarification, refinement, and defence. I have three
points to make here. The first is just a matter of clearing up Wright’s formulation of
his objection. The reconstruction of the subject’s grounds in the desert example that
Wright offers on Coliva’s behalf seems to get things rather back to front. In essentials,
his reconstruction is as follows:
Existential claim Someone has passed this way already
Parent judgment The person who caused these footprints in the sand has passed
this way already
Identity component I  the person who has passed this way before
9 Wright also discusses some other examples that he argues are problematic for Coliva (2012: 258-9); I
leave those aside here.
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Final judgment I am the person who caused these footprints (and so I’m going
around in circles)
However, I offer the following as in the same spirit but more plausible:
Existential claim Someone has passed this way already
Parent judgment The person who caused these footprints in the sand has passed this
way already
Identity I  the person who caused these footprints
Final judgment I have passed this way already (and so I’m going around in circles)
The idea is that the footprints give me grounds to believe the existential claim. More-
over, the fact that there’s not likely to be another person leaving footprints in the desert
together with these footprints matchingmy own in size justifies me in (mis)identifying
the footprints as my own. This, together with the parent judgment, leads me to con-
clude that I have passed this way already, thereby misidentifying myself as witness to
the existential claim. Since the parent judgment is the same in both versions, Wright’s
objection is unaffected by the proposed change.10
My second point does require us to rethink Wright’s objection more substantially.
Coliva has recently responded to his objection, suggesting that there’s an alternative
and more plausible way to reconstruct the subject’s grounds in Wright’s example than
the one he offers on her behalf:
‘…someone sees footprints in the sand going around and forms the mistaken
judgement ‘I am going around in circles’. Here, again it is quite easy to see
how the judgement could be taken to be based on the mistaken identification
component ‘I  the person who is responsible for these footprints I am seeing’
(and since these footprints go around in circles, I then infer that I amgoing around
in circles). Now, Wright’s objection is that the identification component would
be nearly tautological. This depends on Wright’s reconstruction, according to
which we should start off with ‘The person responsible for these footprints going
around in circles is going around in circles’. But this is a straw man.11 As we
saw, the person sees footprints, she realizes those footprints go around in circles.
She takes herself to be identical to the person who has made those footprints,
from which she infers she is going around in circles. Clearly, when correctly
represented, in neither case is the identification component (nearly) a tautology:
it is not part of themeaning of ‘that animal’ or ‘I’ that it be the animal responsible
for the odor I can smell, or that it be the person who is causally responsible for
certain footprints. Yet, I would suggest that precisely because those identification
components are readily available to us, based on the informationwe contextually
have (e.g. a certain odor or certain footprints, etc.), we do not have any reason
to follow Pryor in suggesting that these cases do not involve any identification
component.’ (Coliva 2018: 782)
We can lay Coliva’s proposal in this passage out as we did with the proposal Wright
suggested on her behalf. Unfortunately, Coliva isn’t explicit about what she takes the
10 Thanks to Michele Palmira here.
11 In fact, the ‘strawman’ proposal Coliva attributes toWright in this passage isn’t the proposal he criticizes,
which is ‘The person who caused these footprints in the sand has passed this way already’.
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relevant existential claim to be. We might carry over what Wright suggested on her
behalf, namely ‘someone has passed this way already’. However, looking at the quote
above suggests an alternative, since the final judgment seems to be ‘I am going around
in circles’ rather than ‘I have passed this way already’. Hence we have:
Parent judgment These footprints go around in circles
Existential claim Someone is going around in circles
Identity I  the person who caused these footprints
Final judgment I am going around in circles
This time we start with the parent judgment, made on the basis of seeing the footprints,
and recognising that it’s unlikely that there are two walkers out in the desert. This then
plays a role in justifying both the existential claim and, via the identity, the final
judgment which misidentifies myself as the witness to that existential.
However, I don’t thinkColiva’s proposal here is a natural or independently plausible
reconstruction of my grounds or reasoning in the example. The natural progression
of the reasoning in the example is, I contend, as follows: the reason that I come to
mistakenly think that the footprints go in a circle is that I have misidentified those
footprints as my own, due to the match in size and the unlikeness of their being a
second person wandering around leaving such footprints. On that basis I infer that I am
going in circles; after all, if I were not going in circles I wouldn’t have re-encountered
my own tracks. Coliva’s proposal conflicts with this reconstruction of the reasoning
involved in this case. Her alternative suggestion is that upon seeing the footprints, I
infer that they’re going around in circles (based, as noted above, on the unlikeliness
of two walkers being out in the desert), and only then start to draw inferences about
whose footprints they might be, via the false identification of myself and the maker
of the footprints. This seems relatively unnatural and unmotivated. Again, insisting
that the example involves a subject who reasons from a mistaken identification leads
us to distort our picture of the grounds and reasoning involved, in ways that lack
independent motivation.12
That’s not a knockdown objection to Coliva’s proposal, but it can be further
supported by considering a rival positive proposal about the subject’s grounds and
reasoning in Wright’s example, one that elaborates on the intuitive account sketched
in the previous paragraph. This will be my third point of advance on Wright’s own
discussion, since he isn’t very explicit on this issue. Based on the footprints, the subject
has grounds for:
Existential claim Someone has passed this way already
This existential claim, together with the improbability that someone else is walking
around this desert (with footprints roughly matching the size and shape of my own),
justify me in believing that:
Parent judgment These are my footprints
So:
Final judgement I have passed this way already (and so I’m going around in circles!)
12 Thanks to anonymous referees who helped me better understand Coliva’s proposal here.
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The identification of myself as witness to the existential doesn’t involve a misiden-
tification, but rather an inference to the best—in this case, to what’s seemingly the
only plausible—explanation; I first see the footprints and infer that they must be mine.
This then serves as the parent judgment for the obvious further conclusion that I have
passed this way around (and somust be going in circles). The inference here resembles
the one made by John Perry’s infamous shopper, who concludes that he is making a
mess based on this being the best explanation of why he can’t catch up with the person
whose sugar sack is leaking (Perry 1979). Indeed, Wright’s example is essentially a
variant of Perry’s, changed so that the subject’s final judgment is an error through
misidentification rather than a truth.13
On the analysis I have offered, Wright’s example is a genuine case of wh-
misidentification, one in which the inferential step involved doesn’t rest on any
mistaken identity claim. If one accepts my claim that this analysis of the exam-
ple is more natural and better motivated by features of the case than the alternative
offered by Coliva, that undermines her argument for maintaining that all cases of wh-
misidentification aremerely superficial variants of de remisidentification. It shows that
it’s only by insisting on a distorted and unmotivated account of the grounds involved
in examples like Wright’s over a more natural alternative that it can be made to seem
plausible that wh-misidentification is ‘spurious’, only differing from de re misiden-
tification in superficial respects. This isn’t quite what Wright’s objection claimed to
show; Wright concluded that there are examples of wh-misidentification that could
only be treated along the lines suggested by Coliva by rendering the subject’s grounds
completely informationally impoverished. I haven’t vindicated this conclusion, but
I’ve tried to show that Wright’s example is genuinely problematic for Coliva’s argu-
ment, and that her recent response doesn’t suffice to see the problem off. None of
this should be taken as a denial that there are deep similarities between de re and wh-
misidentification—I’ll try to draw these out below in Sect. 5—but contrary to Coliva’s
conclusion, they are distinct phenomena.
There’s a second objection to Coliva, one that Wright seems not to have been
in a position to appreciate (though others have: see in particular Garcia-Carpintero
2018: 3320). As Wright characterises wh-misidentification, it occurs when ‘a thinker
goes into a situation equipped with grounds for a unique existential claim—a claim
that there is exactly one object meeting a certain condition—and then, on receipt of
additional (mis)information of a certain kind, proceeds to misidentify a particular
object as the witness of that claim’ (2012: 255, emphasis in original). However, the
insistence that the subject in cases of wh-misidentification has grounds that support a
unique existential claim doesn’t seem to have any basis in Pryor’s original discussion,
and his skunk example doesn’t fit this description:
I smell a skunky odor, and see several animals rummaging around in my garden.
None of them has the characteristic white stripes of a skunk, but I believe that
some skunks lack these stripes. Approaching closer and sniffing, I form a belief,
of the smallest of these animals, that it is a skunk in my garden. This belief is
13 Wright isn’t explicit about this, but he does comment earlier in his paper on the possibility of altering
Perry’s example so as to be a case of error through misidentification; see Wright (2012: 259).
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mistaken. There are several skunks in my garden, but none of them is the small
animal I see. (Pryor 1999: 281, emphasis added)
The skunky smell and rummaging animals in no way give me grounds to think that
there is at most one skunk in my garden, and the resulting mistaken belief that I form
reflects this; Pryor is clear that my mistaken belief is that the smallest of the animals
that I can now see is a skunk in my garden.
What’s the bearing of these observations on Coliva’s argument against wh-
misidentification? It’s this; at a crucial juncture in her argument, she too assumes
that I am licensed to take there to be only one animal that’s responsible for the skunky
odour that I can smell. Her proposal, recall, is that I mistakenly believe that the animal
that I can now see is a skunk because I have based this belief on the parent judgment
that the animal in my garden which is actually responsible for this odour I can smell is
a skunk and the following identity claim: this animal (that I can now see) the animal
in my garden which is actually responsible for this odour I can smell. However, we’ve
just seen that in Pryor’s example, I lack any justification for thinking that at most one
of the animals that I can see in my garden is responsible for the skunky odour that I can
smell. So my grounds for my mistaken belief that the smallest animal that I can see is
a skunk don’t plausibly include either of the premises that Coliva insists they include,
since both premises presuppose that there’s a unique animal in my garden which is
actually responsible for this odour I can smell, and to repeat, I have no justification
for that at all.
In the end Coliva’s proposal about the kinds of grounds involved in wh-
misidentification meets the same fate as Smith’s; it turns out that it isn’t even plausible
for the primary example that Pryor offers us to illustrate the phenomenon.14 Hence
Coliva’s proposal about the kinds of grounds involved in apparent cases of wh-
misidentification is to be rejected, and her argument that wh-misidentification is
spurious can be resisted.
5 What is immunity to wh-misidentification?
So far I have argued that neither of the attempts in the literature to show that
wh-misidentification lacks significance or collapses into de re misidentification
are successful. Let us turn now to the task of offering characterisations of wh-
misidentification and the associated notions of immunity and vulnerability. I take
as my starting point the idea that our characterisations should be modelled as closely
on our characterisations of de re misidentification and immunity to de re misidentifi-
14 This points to a mild disagreement with Garcia-Carpintero. He suggests that Coliva’s proposal works
for the skunk example due to ‘idiosyncrasies of Pryor’s example’ and he offers an alternative example
intended to show that Coliva’s proposal doesn’t work in cases where there the subject has no grounds for
a unique existential (2018: 3320). I think that the differences between Garcia-Carpintero’s example and
Pryor’s are purely cosmetic, and that it is commentators such as Coliva and Wright that have introduced
the ‘idiosyncrasies’. One (admittedly minor) reason this matters is that Palmira has suggested on Coliva’s
behalf that shemight contend that Garcia-Carpintero’s case isn’t one ofmisidentification at all (2019: 162). I
don’t find this reply all that plausible for Garcia-Carpintero’s case, but it seems tantamount to an admission




cation as possible, in order to be able to see both the similarities and the differences.
Here is my proposed account of cases of wh-misidentification:
i′′. One has groundsG that justify one in believing the existential generalization that
something is F.
ii′′. One’s grounds G do not justify one in believing that everything (in the relevant
domain) is F.
iii′′. Partly on the basis of G, one has justification (or believes oneself to have
justification) for believing of some particular object a that it is F.
iv′′. However, one’s grounds G do not derive from the fact that a is F, if this even
is a fact.15
Consider Pryor’s skunk example once again. On the basis of the skunky odour in my
garden, I have grounds G that justify me in believing the existential generalisation that
there is a skunk in my garden (but not the corresponding universal generalisation).
Partly on the basis of the smell, and partly on the basis of vision, I gain justification
for believing that the smallest of the animals I can see running around is a skunk in
my garden. However, my grounds G do not derive from the fact that the smallest of
the animals in my garden is a skunk; indeed, in the case as Pryor describes it, the
animal in question isn’t even a skunk. According to clause iv′′. that’s not essential
to wh-misidentification; as I emphasised above the crucial point is that even if it had
been a skunk, the truth of my belief would be a matter of luck, given that my grounds
don’t derive from this fact about that animal.16
15 It’s not enough to require, as an earlier formulation of this clause did, that one’s grounds do not ‘derive
from’ facts about the object a. Suppose that I know that a particular smell is equally likely to indicate skunks
in my garden or that my neighbour is burning tires, and I also know that the smell of burning tires will drive
all animals out of my garden. I smell the distinctive smell, and this justifies me in judging that there’s either
a skunk in my garden or that my neighbour is burning tires again. I then see what appears to be a skunk
in my garden, but in fact it’s a realistic skunk decoy planted by my neighbour to disguise his tire-burning
activities. My combined olfactory and visual grounds justify me in believing the existential that there’s a
skunk in my garden, and that this particular object (the decoy) is a witness to this existential. Unlike in
Pryor’s original example, however, my grounds in this variant do derive from the object I misidentify as a
skunk, namely the decoy. Still, this seems to be a case of misidentification. On the formulation of clause
iv”. offered in the text, this is so because one’s grounds for the existential do not derive from the fact that
this object is a skunk in my garden; indeed, there is no such fact, since the object in question is a mere
decoy. I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for presenting this variant as a counterexample to my earlier
formulation, and prompting me to think more carefully about how to state my clauses; Jonathan Jenkins
Ichikawa and Stephan Torre raised similar points in discussion. Interestingly, the variant example appears
to be a counterexample to Daniel Morgan’s rival account of wh-misidentification, discussed below.
16 An anonymous reviewer reasonably complains that one might find it unnatural to think of such cases as
involving wh-misidentification, since one correctly identifies a witness to the existential, and they suggest
adding a condition to the effect that a is not F (parallel to Pryor’s condition iii’ in Sect. 2 above). The
point is related to one made by Wright, who observes that it seems infelicitous to describe cases of wh-
misidentification in which one’s final judgment is false as cases of error through misidentification, since
‘the error consists in a misidentification, rather than being caused by one’ (2012: 256). Cases of de re
misidentification which result in a true judgment are easier to stomach, since one’s final judgment still
rests on a misidentification; the corresponding putative cases of wh-misidentification don’t even rest on
a mistaken identity claim. I’m sympathetic to the idea that there’s an oddity to describing these as cases
of misidentification, and I could perhaps be persuaded that an additional condition is required, but I’m
currently inclined to think that what’s key to the phenomenon is the shared structure picked out by the
clauses I’ve offered, rather than whether the usual label remains apt once we recognise that the range of
cases that exhibit that structure is broader than we might have supposed prior to Pryor’s paper; see the
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Clause ii′′. wouldn’t be necessary if clause i′′. had required that one’s grounds
justify one in believing a unique existential claim—something I rejected in the previous
section. With clause i′′. as it stands, clause ii′′. is needed to exclude certain kinds of
false positives. For example, suppose that one’s grounds justify one in believing that
something is F, and that if something is F then everything is. For example, I might
know that someone has a maximally infectious disease, and know that if one person
has it, the whole group must have it too. Since Steve is one of the group, I conclude
that Steve has the disease. Without condition ii′′., this would meet the conditions for
wh-misidentification, but intuitively it’s not a case of wh-misidentification; indeed,
this reasoning to the conclusion that Steve has the disease seems unimpeachable.17
Given this account of wh-misidentification, we can then characterise immunity and
vulnerability to wh-misidentification straightforwardly, and in a way that parallels
Pryor’s own characterisation of immunity and vulnerability to de re misidentification:
a judgment that a is F is immune to wh-misidentification when justified by grounds
G just in case it is not possible for one to make that judgment on grounds G, and that
judgment exhibit wh-misidentification, and it is vulnerable to wh-misidentification
just in case it’s not immune.18
These characterisations of wh-misidentification and immunity to wh-
misidentification are simpler and more natural than Pryor’s own, and they are
modelled as directly as possible on the characterisations of de re misidentification
and the associated notion of immunity that Pryor himself proposes. This may not
be immediately apparent, just from looking at both sets of clauses. So what are the
key differences with Pryor’s own account, and why do they mark improvements?19
Pryor’s clause ii′ and my clause iii′′ are virtually identical, so we can bracket those.
Pryor doesn’t include any analogue of clause ii′′, though the motivations for including
some such clause, rehearsed above, seem just as pressing. The really important
differences concern my clauses i′′ and iv′′. Clause i′′. requires only that one’s grounds
justify the existential generalisation, while Pryor’s clause i′. requires that one’s
grounds offer one knowledge of that existential generalisation. As noted above,
‘offering one knowledge’ is a strangely defined technical notion for Pryor, and it’s
also factive, which means that this clause leads to issues with accommodating cases
of wh-misidentification in which the existential claim in question is justified but
false; I’ll give an example shortly. The same point motivates the differences between
Pryor’s clause iii′. and my iv′′. Pryor’s clause requires that some other object (other
than the one that the subject misidentifies as a witness) is F and is responsible for the
Footnote 16 continued
main text below for further discussion. Of course, this issue about what’s most important here raises the
question of what work we want the notion of wh-misidentification to do—I touch on this in the conclusion,
but mostly have to leave the issue for another occasion.
17 Thanks to Alex Byrne for the example and for pushing me to modify my account to deal with it. I suspect
that condition ii”. needs finessing, but I won’t attempt that here, partly for methodological reasons I’ll come
to shortly in the main text.
18 As with the characterization of de re misidentification offered in Sect. 2, this should be seen as char-
acterizing basic cases of wh-misidentification; see, e.g. Hu (2017) for some refinements one might want
to add to accommodate further cases. This way of characterising ‘immunity’ ignores the main proposal of
McGlynn (2016), which is to rethink the modality implicit in the notion; this doesn’t reflect any change of
mind on my part, but rather that I don’t want to introduce further complexities here.
19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to be clearer on this.
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grounds the subject has, and so that the existential generalisation that something is F
be true. Pryor’s clause iii′. also requires that it is false that the object identified by the
subject is F, despite his recognition elsewhere in his paper that such an error doesn’t
seem to be crucial to misidentification. These differences are all respects in which
my account of wh-misidentification preserves similarities with de re misidentification
better than Pryor’s own; according to Pryor’s own account, laid out in Sect. 2 above,
cases of de re misidentification do not require that one’s final judgment that object b is
F is false, nor that one’s original judgment that a is F is true, but only that one judges
that b is F because of a false identification of a and b. The differences introduced by
Pryor obscure some of the structural similarities between de re misidentification and
wh-misidentication, and there’s no obvious rationale for them.20 That’s why I claim
that my account of wh-misidentification (and the associated notion of immunity) is
simpler than Pryor’s.
However, it should be conceded that the apparent simplicity of my account may
be superficial. The idea it’s trying to capture is hopefully clear enough. One has
general grounds for an existential which also (perhaps in collaboration with some
other information) justify one in identifying an object as witness, but contrary to
appearances, one’s grounds aren’t really caused or explained by that object having the
property in question. As a result, given one’s grounds, one’s judgment that this object
is a witness ends up false or merely true by luck. The account attempts to make this
kind of epistemic structure clearer—but with appeal to some rather vague and slippery
notions, such as the requirement that one’s grounds for the existential not ‘derive’ from
particular facts about the particular object which one (mis)identifies as a witness.
This is a reasonable worry to have with the account I’ve proposed. I have several
things to say in response. First, notice that many of these issues are ones that I have
inherited fromPryor’s own account, sincemy clauses aremodelled on his. In particular,
the issues raised in the previous paragraph will equally bite for Pryor. That doesn’t
mean we should ignore these issues, but it does suggest that they are general, rather
than specific to my proposal.
Second, these worries should not at all come as a surprise, given the nature of
the account offered here. The account in a sense centres the point I started with,
namely Pryor’s suggestion that error through misidentification isn’t a particularly
significant category. Instead, the key thing about misidentification is that it gives rise
to justificatory structures which can equally lead to to false beliefs or to Gettiered
ones, depending on how the facts are. As an analogy, consider one of Gettier’s own
examples (1963). Smith justifiably believes that the person who will get the job has
10 coins in their pocket, based on having counted the coins in Jones’s pocket and
having authoritatively (but misleadingly) heard that Jones will get the job. Whether
this belief is false or Gettiered depends on how things happen to stand with respect to
the number of coins in Smith’s own pocket; the underlying fact is that Smith’s grounds
don’t derive from the number of coins in his own pocket, and that’s why his belief can
at best be true by luck. On the account offered here, misidentification involves grounds
that give rise to ignorance in this Gettier-like manner. Given this, it’s no wonder that
20 Moreover, these differences mean that Pryor is unable to characterise immunity to wh-misidentification
in a parallel way to how he understands immunity to de re misidentification, introducing further differences
and complexity; see McGlynn (2016: 34–35) for discussion.
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it runs into many of the problems that go under the banner of ‘the Gettier problem’
in contemporary epistemology: that is, the problem of offering an informative and
non-circular account of the distinction between knowledge and ignorance in terms of
true belief, in light of Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite account.21
Third, the comparison to Gettier cases may suggest there will be limits to howmuch
I can say in elaborating the account offered, but it also sheds some light on how to
understand the account. The idea underlying the conditions for wh-misidentification
I have offered is that in cases that meet these conditions, as in Gettier cases such as
the one described above, there’s a disconnect between what justifies a particular belief
and the facts that cause or explain its truth (or falsity). In Gettier’s example, Smith’s
belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is justified
via the false but justified belief that Jones will get the job and the true belief that
Jones has ten coins in his pocket, when what makes Smith’s final belief true are facts
about his own employment situation and the number of coins in his own pocket. It’s
this disconnect that’s responsible for the fact mentioned above, namely that Smith’s
belief can at best be true by luck.22 Pryor’s skunk case has essentially this dynamic
too, though the details are a little different and more complicated than in Gettier’s
example.23 I have grounds that justify me in believing the existential claim that there’s
a skunk in my garden. These grounds derive from a particular animal (or particular
animals), namely the animal(s) responsible for the skunky odour. I mistakenly infer
that that—the smallest of the animals I can see in my garden—is responsible for the
smell, and so erroneously conclude that it is a skunk in my garden. If we can make
sense of the disconnect characteristic of Gettier cases, we should be able tomake sense
of the structure imposed on cases of wh-misidentification by clause iii′′, even if we’d
like to be able to say something more informative about both.
Since this has been a big part of the motivation behind my approach in this section,
I also want to stress again the commonalities between de re misidentification and wh-
misidentification on the account offered here. As noted above, de re misidentification
also has a Gettierish structure. One’s final judgment that a is F can at best be true
by luck, since the link with b’s being F is spurious (even though one was justified in
taking a  b to be true); in cases of error through misidentification, one’s judgment
is false because a doesn’t just happen to match b in the relevant respect.24
21 Pryor also makes this connection to the Gettier problem, though in the context of introducing the notion
of a subject’s grounds offering them knowledge of a proposition (1999: 281).
22 I don’t intend this as a general account of why the subjects in Gettier cases are ignorant, since it faces
familiar problems; for example, I don’t think it works for ‘fake barn’ cases (see McGlynn 2014: 8–10).
23 Gettier’s own examples all involve a subject deductively inferring a justified true belief from a justified
but false belief, and the inference in the skunk example is ampliative. However, we already know to expect
variety here. For example, Bertrand Russell’s stopped clock is often taken to show that Gettierised beliefs
don’t need to be inferential at all; one truly and justifiably believes that it is two o’clock based on the position
of the clock hands, without having inferred this from anything—but this belief is merely true by luck, since
the clock’s hands uncharacteristically got stuck twelve hours prior.
24 One might wonder, given what I’ve written above, whether misidentification and vulnerability to error
through misidentification are just the same notion. In my view, they are not. Consider another example
of Wright’s, in which I see my Aunt Lillian at close quarters and judge that Aunt Lillian is wearing
an extraordinary hat today (2012: 42). Wright insists that this judgment is not immune to error through
misidentification, since (unlikely as this may be) my aunt may have an identical twin I don’t know about
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Could we do better? I’ll close this section by considering a recent rival account of
immunity to wh-misidentification, due to Daniel Morgan, that promises to avoid the
challenges faced by my account altogether.25 I’ll argue that it just saddles us with yet
more difficult problems.
Morgan’s account has two principal parts. First, we have a definition of immunity
to wh-misidentification which appeals to the notion of ‘independent knowledge’:
A judgment of the form ‘a is F’ is, relative to certain grounds g, immune to error
through wh-misidentification if and only if g justifies ‘a is F’ without offering
independent knowledge of ‘Something is F’. (2019: 446)
Second, we have a criterion for when grounds offer independent knowledge, in the
relevant sense:
Grounds g offer knowledge of q that is independent of the justification they
provide for p if and only if one can know that q on the basis of g, even if p is
false. (2019: 447)
We can illustrate this account by taking a final pass at Pryor’s skunk example. My
judgment that this (the smallest animal I can see in my garden) is a skunk is vulnerable
to wh-misidentification given my grounds since those grounds justify this judgment,
and even if this judgment is false, my grounds can affordme knowledge that something
in my garden is a skunk (given the skunky odour). This shows that my grounds justify
my judgment that this is a skunk while offering me independent knowledge of the
existential. We can see that it must be independent knowledge because I’d still have
it even if my judgment about this particular animal were false, and you can’t get
knowledge from falsehood; that is, inferential knowledge can only come frompremises
which are themselves true (2019: 447).26
So far so good, and Morgan seems to have bypassed the need to try to elucidate
the tricky notions that appear in both Pryor’s characterisation and my own. However,
there are at least two reasons to be worried with this alternative. First, the appeal to
the factive concept, knowledge, in the characterisation leads to some intuitively odd
results.27 Suppose that there’s a skunky odour in my garden, but no skunks; the odour
is due to tires being burned in the neighbourhood. Suppose also that these (misleading)
olfactory grounds, together with my visual impression of the animals in my garden,
justifies me in believing of that (the smallest of those animals) that it is a skunk. So
the example is exactly as in Pryor’s original, except that the existential claim that
Footnote 24 continued
and couldn’t distinguish visually even at a short distance. I agree (2016), and it follows from this that the
judgment is likewise vulnerable to misidentification more generally. But the judgment, made on these visual
grounds, is not a case of misidentification if it really is my aunt and she has no twin; it’s not merely luck
that my judgment is correct, given those grounds, in the Gettierish way I’ve suggested is characteristic of
misidentification. So the example suggests that a judgment, made on certain grounds, can be vulnerable to
error through misidentification and vulnerable to misidentification without thereby being an actual case of
misidentification.
25 Thanks to Manuel Garica-Carpintero for pushing me to say something in response to Morgan’s account.
26 The claim will be familiar from ‘no false lemmas’ accounts of knowledge, according to which Smith’s
justified true belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket fails to be knowledge
because it rests on the ‘false lemma’ that Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
27 As we noted with Pryor’s account above: see McGlynn (2016: 34–5).
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there’s a skunk in my garden happens to be false. I don’t think this difference should
affect whether the example gets classed as one of wh-misidentification, and this is the
result given by the account I’ve sketched above; that account of wh-misidentification
requires that one have grounds that justify one in believing the existential and that
one believes it on this basis, but it doesn’t require that the existential is true. On Mor-
gan’s account, however, the grounds I have in the modified example clearly don’t offer
me independent knowledge that something is a skunk, since this existential claim is
false. So the account rules this judgment, made on these grounds, as immune to wh-
misidentification. That seems like the wrong result. We might be tempted to think
that this is a superficial problem, since we can just replace the requirement of inde-
pendent knowledge in Morgan’s account of immunity to wh-misidentification with a
requirement of independent justification. However, this won’t work. The criterion for
knowledge to be independent is supposed to work because you can’t get knowledge
from falsehood (Morgan 2019: 447); but almost everyone will agree that you can get
justification from falsehood (as when Smith gets a justified belief that the person who
will get the job has ten coins in his pocket by inferring this from the false lemma that
Jones will get the job).
This point leads us to the primary problemwithMorgan’s account. There have been
a number of examples that suggest that the ‘fact about knowledge’ Morgan appeals to,
that there’s no getting knowledge from a falsehood, is simply false. Take an example
from TedWarfield (2005). I might have miscounted the number of people at a talk I’m
giving, reaching a total of 67 when they are actually 66 in the room. If I infer from this
that the 100 handouts I’ve printed off will suffice, this seems to be knowledge even
though my premise is false. My purpose here is not to join or try to resolve this debate
about knowledge (though I do think that knowledge from falsehood is possible: see
McGlynn 2014: 7). My point is just that there’s a major epistemological controversy
at the heart of Morgan’s account.28 These two worries with Morgan’s view should
suffice to cast some doubt on the idea that we can simply avoid the issues raised by
my account without incurring significant costs.29
6 Concluding remarks
I have argued that wh-misidentification and its associated notion of immunity are
genuine phenomena, at least in the sense that they are neither ‘spurious’ nor mere
superficial variants of their de re analogues. I’ve also suggested that we can offer
an account of wh-misidentification that both respects the differences between these
varieties of misidentification and illuminates what they have in common. What we
surely want to know now is what the significance of all this is, if it’s correct. Why
does it matter if Pryor’s right that misidentification and immunity to misidentification
28 Morgan acknowledges this controversy in a brief endnote (2019: 455 n12), and responds by citing
a paper that he thinks settles it in his favour, Ball and Blome-Tillmann (2014). For replies to Ball and
Blome-Tillmann’s paper, see Luzzi (2014) and (2019), and Buford and Cloos (2018).
29 As mentioned in footnote 15 above, there may be a third problem, since a variant of Pryor’s example
appears to be a counterexample to Morgan’s account. I lack space to unpack the details of this worry here.
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come in more than one flavour, and what are the consequences of adopting the specific
account I have offered?
I mentioned in the introduction that Pryor argues for the significance of immunity
to wh-misidentification in part by contending that it allows us to settle a dispute
between Shoemaker and Evans. The dispute concerns the bearing of the apparent
metaphysical possibility of quasi-remembering—having memory impressions of an
event ‘from the inside’ that may derive from an event either in one’s own past or in
the past of someone else—for the thesis that memory-based judgments about one’s
own past are immune to error through misidentification. Evans (1982) holds that such
judgments are immune, since the grounds served up by memory are already first-
personal, and so judgments about one’s own past based on such grounds will not
be based on any identification, leaving no scope for error through misidentification.
In contrast, Shoemaker (1970) points out that if I mistakenly judge that I was F,
having quasi-remembered someone else’s past, this does seem to involve an error
through misidentification; I have misidentified myself as the person whose past my
memory-impressions derive from, and reached a false judgment about my past on
that basis. Memory-based judgments about one’s own past may enjoy a kind of ‘de
facto’ immunity to error through misidentification, according to Shoemaker, since
quasi-remembering is merely possible, but that’s it. Pryor sides with Shoemaker in
this debate, though he adds that Shoemaker’s claims are most plausible when taken as
claims about immunity to wh-misidentification. Even if it must be conceded that such
judgments are immune to de re misidentification, ‘with respect to the most interesting
sort of immunity, Shoemaker is right: our first-person memory-based beliefs do not
have that sort of immunity’ (1999: 272)—or rather, they have it ‘at best’ only in a de
facto sense (1999: 290).30
One key reason Pryor offers for thinking that Shoemaker’s claim is more plausible
when interpreted as concerning immunity towh-misidentification is that one ofEvans’s
main objections to Shoemaker lapses if we do. Evans’s objection, as Pryor interprets
him, is that in cases in which one has quasi-remembered events from another person’s
past, one won’t typically be in a position to hold de re thoughts about that person in
virtue of this link, and so one won’t be able to so much as entertain the false identity
claim that would need to be in play for there to be room for misidentification (Pryor
1999: 293; compare Evans 1982: 243–244). As one might expect, Pryor’s response
is that even if we concede the point, it tells us nothing about whether memory-based
judgments about one’s past are immune towh-misidentification; this is the application,
advertised in the introduction, of Pryor’s claim that a judgment can be immune to de
re misidentification without being immune to wh-misidentification.
The on-going philosophical interest in competing accounts of wh-misidentification
in large part concerns their bearing on Pryor’s intervention into this debate.31 Myself
and others have argued against Pryor’s claim that casting Shoemaker’s side in terms
of immunity to wh-misidentification makes it more plausible (see McGlynn 2016 and
Morgan 2019), and I’m still inclined to think that’s the right conclusion. But the matter
30 SeeCappelen andDever (2013: 133) andMcGlynn (2016) for criticismof the notion of de facto immunity
to misidentification.
31 Hu (2017) argues that it also has significance for debates concerning whether examples of thought-
insertion show that our beliefs about our own minds are vulnerable to misidentification.
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deserves renewed attention in light of what I’ve argued here, and I haven’t as yet done
anything to answer the second question posed above, concerning the impact on the
debate of adopting my particular conception of wh-misidentification rather than one
of its rivals. While I lack the space to answer that question here, I hope to have made
sufficient progress on refining our understanding of wh-misidentification and how it
relates to and differs from de re misidentification to set the scene for the necessary
discussion.
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